of us." Laughing at the recollection of the scene, Eisenhardt noted that from his perspective, the Premier behaved as a real gentleman. Needless, to say, the province of Quebec, like other provinces for that matter, never accepted any cost-sharing agreement with the short lived National Fitness Council. 1 With this example of jurisdictional conflict in mind, one might think that, besides ice hockey, fighting over intergovernmental rela tions is one of the most popular sports in Canadian politics. Indeed, on many policy issues, the federal government and the provincial and territorial governments invariably clash over which one has jurisdiction to act in a variety of policy fields. Other examples of such intergovernmental conflicts over sport include Loto-Canadaput in place by the federal government in the early 1970s to finance the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games-and the funding of the Jeux du Québec. With regard to Loto-Canada, the position of the provinces was and still is that lotteries fall under the jurisdiction of the prov inces. 2 Another example was the provisions set by the Province of Quebec in the 1990s to prevent the federal government from directly funding the Jeux du Québec, a creation of the province. However, besides these persistent frictions, there are also numerous instances of collaboration between these two levels of government, as shall be discussed in this chapter. Indeed, following Painter (1991) , two forms of intergovernmental relationships have always existed in Canada: competitive federalism, in which each level of government fights to keep its jurisdictional prerogatives, and collaborative federalism, where the different levels of government negotiate their respective roles on a given dossier or a broad policy field. Sport is no different from other policy fields in this regard.
But, these federal-provincial/territorial interactions reflect only one aspect of the general picture of intergovernmental relationships in Canada, since cities and municipalities, although they are creations of the provinces according to section 92 (8) of the Constitution Act of 1867, do form a de facto third order of government of great importance for sport. First, historically municipalities (i.e., local governments) were the first level of government to intervene in that field. At the end of the nineteenth century, long before provinces and the federal government became involved, cities such as Montreal and Toronto and many others started to intervene in sport, either positively by granting subsidies to local sport clubs and organizations like the YMCAs, or negatively, for example by passing by-laws preventing the practice of specific sports in their parks. 3 Second, currently, municipalities nearly always provide low-cost infrastructures as well as subsidies to local sport organizations, catering to a much greater proportion of Canadians' overall participation in sports in compari son to high performance sports. Consequently, in relation to overall expenditure, as well as in terms of total value of expenditure, col lectively Canadian municipalities constitute the level of government that invests the most in sport. Although, to our knowledge, there are no recent figures available, in 1999 Statistics Canada published estimates of sport and recreation expenditures for fiscal year 1997-98 that aptly illustrate the weight of each level of government in terms of sport-related public spending. According to these estimates the federal government spent CA$ 431.7M, the provinces CA$ 551.2M and the municipalities CA$ 3.615B during that year, representing 9.4%, 12%, and 78%, respectively, of all government sport expenditures (Luffman, 1999) .
While they play an important role in sport, municipalities are not in a position of power in the game of intergovernmental rela tions, since, first, they are, as mentioned above, creations of the provinces which define what their prerogatives will be and, sec ond, they are increasingly lacking the finances and other resources to fulfill their obligations (e.g., rising costs associated with sport infrastructures, shrinking tax-based sources of revenues). Central governments in federations like Canada are increasingly driven into intervening at the municipal level either directly or indi rectly through the provinces and territories or through mecha nisms that allow them to bypass second-tier levels of government (i.e., provinces/territories). It is notably the case in Canada with the federal power of the purse, which allows the federal govern ment to spend money in fields that are not normally under its jurisdiction.
Finally, at each level of government, several social forces are present. Local clubs consistently rely on access to municipal infrastructures and subsidies to run their programs. Local boost ers lobby their cities as well as higher levels of government to host numerous forms of sport events. At the provincial/territorial level, provincial/territorial sport organizations (P/TSOs) depend heavily on provincial/territorial government funding for their day-to-day operations. Such is also the case for national sport organizations (NSOs) at the national level, as well as organizations such as the Canadian Olympic Committee (COC), which represents the IOC's interests on Canadian soil.
Given the above, one may be led to believe that it made sense that one of the four goals of the former Canadian Sport Policy (CSP) was "Enhanced Interaction." In the CSP, interaction meant collabo ration and co-operation within the sport sector as well as among federal-provincial/territorial governments. As stated in the CSP, the goal was that by 2012, "the components of the sport system [become] more connected and coordinated as a result of committed collabora tion and communications among stakeholders" (Sport Canada, 2002a, p. 19) . In order to reach that goal, according to the CSP, governments were to undertake the following: increase collaboration within and among governments and between sectors, "foster stronger relations between national and provincial/territorial sport organizations," "foster stronger relations between sport organizations and educa tional institutions," "strengthen relations between governments and their sport communities," and "strengthen international strategies to promote Canadian sport values" (Sport Canada, 2002a, p. 19) .
In the 2012 CSP, the former "Enhanced Interaction" has been replaced by the notion of a "Collaborative" policy (Sport Canada, 2012) . In his book on public engagement as a new approach to policy making, Lenihan (2012) emphasizes the realization by the leaders in charge, right from the beginning of the CSP renewal process, of the complexity of the new policy environment. As a result, adds Lenihan (2012) , collaboration among the different stakeholders in the mapping out of the policy space became the only possible way to develop the new policy in such a complex environment. So collabora tion (as opposed to negotiations around competitive views) became the keyword right from the outset of the policy renewal process. Actually, as stated in the final version of the policy, the "collabora tive" notion first appears within a new vision of "a dynamic and innovative culture" (Sport Canada, 2012, p. 5) , that is, a policy that calls for "building collaborative partnerships and linkages within the sport system, as well as with other sectors such as education and health, with municipalities, local governments and community organizations, and within schools, recreation providers and the private sector" (Sport Canada, 2012, p. 5) . Second, 'collaboration' is ranked as one of the seven overall policy core principles and there fore becomes "integrated into all sport-related policies and programs" (Sport Canada, 2012, p. 6) . Visually, this policy principle is partially rendered in the 2012 CSP framework, through a series of arrows radiating from the contexts of sport participation and pointing to a wide range of sectors that might be involved in or influenced by sport participation (see Figure 1. 2).
The principle is reiterated again in the section on policy imple mentation and action plans. First, the document stipulates that the eventual success of the 2012 CSP lies in the multiplication of 'link ages' involving stakeholders from within and from outside the sport system, some of them noteworthy: "among NSOs, P/TSOs, municipal clubs and community organizations; between the Sport, Education and Recreation sectors-among NGOs [non-government organiza tions] and within governments; and between, federal, provincial and territorial governments and their departments" (Sport Canada, 2012, p. 15) .
Finally, section eight of the policy on the roles and key stake holders is central to this chapter. In summary, first, it is stated that the federal government supports high performance athletes, the coaches and the sport system at the national level as well as the host ing of national and international sport events. Second, the federal government also supports sport participation through the funding of sport organizations and collaboration with provincial and territo rial governments. Third, provincial/territorial governments' areas of focus according to the policy are the support for participation and volunteerism, athlete development, training of officials and coach education, and high performance sport up to the provincial and territorial levels. These governments also support the hosting of sport events. Finally, the document stipulates that the mutual roles of governments described above are in agreement with the National Recreation Statement of 1987, which will be discussed later.
In brief, the above excerpts from the 2002 CSP and the 2012 CSP point to the importance of intergovernmental relationships, as well as to the ideas of collaboration and linkages among various stakehold ers from governments and civil society. The purpose of this chapter is precisely to focus on the intricacies of the relationships between all levels of government in the field of sport, while also taking into account the role of non-profit organizations active in sport. Rather than focusing solely on federal-provincial/territorial relations as most of the intergovernmental literature does, in this chapter, I also exam ine municipalities or more precisely, federal, provincial/territorial and municipal relationships, hence the reference to multi-level governance in this chapter. What are the respective roles of the fed eral, provincial/territorial and municipal governments in sport? What factors shape these relationships? How are the actions of each level of government in sport being co-ordinated? What are the social forces at play in this field? These are some of the questions addressed in this chapter. In order to answer them, I first examine the factors that shape current intergovernmental relationships in Canada broadly, as well as in the field of sport policy more specifically. I then turn my attention to the intricacies and challenges of multi-level gover nance of sport in Canada, with an emphasis on the evolution of the official mechanisms that have been put in place, especially for the delivery of policies and programs that involve more than one level of government. Finally, I conclude by identifying a series of challenges that sport public policy makers are now facing and will continue to face in the near future. But before doing so, I shall define the main concept: multi-level governance.
Nowadays, governance is a prominent notion in political science and in the management literature, as well as in other disciplines. Simply put, governance, according to Kooiman (1993) , refers to the plurality of governing actors and to the interactions between politi cal society (the sphere of the government and of its institutions) and civil society (the private, for-profit and non-profit sectors) in the contemporary government of public affairs. In other words, gover nance is a notion used in the context of a less central role played by contemporary governments and where civil society plays a larger role in decision making through a variety of arrangements such as partnerships, networks, private-public commissions, and so on. Accordingly, multi-level governance refers to: … a system of continuous negotiations among nested govern ments at several territorial tiers […] as a result of a broad process of institutional creation and decisional reallocation that has pulled some previously centralized functions of the state up to the supranational level and some down to the local/regional level. (Marks, 1993, p. 392) In other words, first, multi-level governance refers to various mecha nisms of public policy and decision making between different levels of governments. Second, multi-level governance refers to the inter play between governments and civil society and/or social forces.
Factors that Shape Multi-Level Governance
In this section, I review the main factors that shape multi-level gov ernance in sport. At the highest level, the Constitution Act of 1867 provides the earliest set of rules with regard to the respective roles of the different levels of government that are central to the topic. I have already referred above to section 98(2) of the Act, which stipulates that municipalities are creations of the provinces. That provision makes it extremely difficult for the federal government to interact directly with municipalities. In fact, the federal government cannot do so without the express consent of the provinces. On this specific issue, provincial/territorial governments have historically played different roles regarding federal-municipal relations: monitoring, advocacy, mediation, regulation or partnership (Garcea & Pontikes, 2006) . For example, as I discuss later, in hosting major sport events, municipalities interact with the federal and provincial/territorial gov ernments. In other instances, provincial/territorial governments may mediate or advocate for municipalities in order to obtain, on their behalf, federal financial assistance for specific sport infrastructure projects, for example. The case of the projected new arena in Quebec City is a good example of this type of provincial role. In providing up-front financing for the arena, the Quebec government became an advocate for the capital city of the province in its quest for federal funding, even though the federal government declined the invitation.
Concretely, these roles played by the provincial/territorial governments are also influenced by non-constitutional issues, such as the population and size of the city or the province/territory in question. On one end of the spectrum, since World War II, the big gest Canadian cities, such as Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver, have evolved into major economic and cultural powerhouses, where significant portions of the Canadian population live. Therefore they carry important weight on the Canadian political scene. On the other end of the spectrum, the smallest provinces, both in size and in population, with their limited resources and political weight seldom have the luxury of resisting what could be seen as federal invasions of their jurisdiction.
Other major provisions of the Constitution Act of 1867 outlining the role of government in sport are those dealing with the respective jurisdictions of the provincial/territorial governments in relation to those of the federal government. Provincial/territorial governments have exclusive jurisdiction over property and civil rights (S. 92 (13)), and education (S. 93), as well as general matters of a local nature (such as, for example, community sport). 4 The Constitution is in fact silent on sport and physical activity for one good reason: At the time of the drafting of the Constitution, the fathers of the confederation did not have to care about sport since it was then in its infancy and nowhere on the political map. However, since then, sport has become generally associated with education and/or health, both of which fall under the jurisdiction of the provincial/territorial governments. As for the federal government's jurisdiction, as stated by Barnes (1996) , several sections of the Constitution outline its jurisdiction. Its overall role mainly concerns matters of national and international affairs. As a result, the federal government has clear jurisdiction on matters that relate to national level sport as well as to international sport. Therein lies its main role. Section 91 of the Constitution Act of 1867 touches on aspects that justify larger federal intervention in sport, as it relates to laws regarding peace, order and good govern ment, as well as on commerce, taxes, immigration, citizenship and criminal law, for example (Barnes, 2010) . One example of the initia tives that the federal government can take under these provisions is the Children's Fitness Tax Credit, 5 a measure that directly affects citizens, without the mediation of any other level of government. The exclusive federal jurisdiction over the army justified the first intervention of that level of government in what was then called physical fitness. Indeed, for example, in 1909, Lord Strathcona made a donation to the Government of Canada, which in turn created a trust that provided the Canadian army with funds to enter into partnership with provincial governments to finance physical edu cation in schools (Guay, 1980) . Finally, as stated above, the federal government may complement or support provincial/territorial gov ernments in their respective jurisdictions, namely through grants or shared funding as a legitimate means of exercising its spending power "provided the intervention does not amount to a regulatory scheme relating to matters under provincial jurisdiction" (Barnes, 2010, p. 25) . From this description of some of the provisions of the Constitution, one can conclude that there are as many clear delin eations of government's roles as there are grey areas, a notable example being the extent to which the federal government can use its spending power to 'work its way' into community sport and recreation.
The second layer of factors that shape multi-level governance in sport is formed by legislation. At the federal level, three pieces of legislation had an important impact on one of the main points of contention between the federal and the provincial/territorial governments, that is, cost-sharing programs that deal with physical activity and mass sport participation at the local level. The first piece is the National Physical Fitness Act of 1943 that created the NFC. 6 As referred to in the introduction to this chapter, its provisions led to tensions between the NFC and several provinces. The second piece is Bill C-131, the Fitness and Amateur Sport Act of 1961, which also included cost-sharing provisions that several provincial government leaders resented (Macintosh, Bedecki, & Franks, 1987) . Finally, sec tion 7(1) of Bill C-12, the Act to Promote Physical Activity and Sport of 2003, the current federal legislation, stipulates that the minister may enter into agreements with the provinces and territories for the pay ment of contributions to programs to develop physical activity and sport (Parliament of Canada, 2003) . I shall return to this provision of the act later on. While we find three main pieces of such legislation at the federal level, as pointed out by Barnes (2010) , each province/ territory has also enacted different pieces of sport legislations of their own, putting the list of total provisions beyond the scope of this chapter.
Administrative structures put in place to manage these policies by the different levels of government form a third layer of factors affecting multi-level governance of sport in Canada. At the federal level, two examples illustrate this point. With the creation by the federal government of Recreation Canada in 1972, increasing tensions erupted between the two higher orders of government with regard to their respective role in recreation and mass sport participation. The restructuring of Cabinet in 1993 under the Conservative government led by Kim Campbell resulted in the creation of the Department of Canadian Heritage, to which Sport Canada was reassigned, while Fitness Canada remained with the Ministry of Health (now part of the Healthy Living Unit within the Public Health Agency of Canada). Thus, this restructuring created a strong departmental barrier between the two major divisions of the federal government in charge of sport and physical activity. 7 In the case of Sport Canada, with its inclusion within Canadian Heritage, the use of sport as a tool for the promotion of national identity and unity became even more important.
While sport and physical activity fall under two different administrative structures at the federal government level, they normally fall under only one at the provincial and territorial level. 8 Indeed, as each province and territory has exclusive jurisdiction within its territory over significant aspects of sport, from initiation and recreation to high performance sport selection and development, each of them has the power to adopt its own policies and programs as it sees fit, as long as it does not infringe on the exclusive jurisdic tion of the federal government. Table 2 .1 shows under which min isterial portfolios sport, physical activity and recreation fell, as of September 2013, within provinces and territories. It varies from one constituency to another. The fact that sport is sometimes affiliated with education or with health promotion for example is one indica tion of the emphasis a particular constituency wants to place on sport. Moreover, whether or not the word "sport" appears in the title of a department or ministry is also an indication of the importance of this portfolio for the government in power. Indeed, from one election to another or from one cabinet shuffle to another, the sport portfolio often switches departments altogether, a fact that does nothing to simplify the overall picture. The latter also signals the fluctuat ing importance of sport as a portfolio from time to time. Sport has never reached the status of a stand-alone portfolio. In this context, provinces and territories face two types of challenges with regard to intergovernmental relationships: vertical ones in terms of their rela tions with the federal and the local authorities, as well as horizontal ones in terms of the relationships with their fellow provinces and territories. One illustration of the latest type of constraints that may arise is the attempt by the Quebec provincial Minister to intervene in the case of the infamous assault by Québec Remparts goalie Jonathan Roy on a Chicoutimi goalie during an important junior hockey game in 2008. As a result of the incident, Minister Courchesne, then in charge of the sport portfolio, lobbied the Canadian Hockey League (CHL) and her provincial and territorial colleagues to ban fighting in junior hockey in Canada. As her colleagues would not and could not agree on the ban, because, as opposed to Quebec, they do not have the legislative power to intervene, the Province of Quebec was left with the option to push the Ligue de hockey junior majeur du Québec to adopt stronger rules against fighting within its league only.
So far, the factors listed above all refer to government machin ery, but the very nature of sport, physical activity and recreation, as well as the presence of a myriad of organizations within civil society active in that field, also has a strong influence on intergovernmental relationships. First, because of the pyramidal structure of competitive sport, from the local club to international sport federations and the International Olympic Committee, sport calls for the attention of all levels of governments, as well as collaboration and co-ordination. Second, because the structure of sport is based mainly on non-profit or for-profit organizations, the members of these organizations try to influence the actions of governments in order to fulfill their own interest. Here the notion of multi-level governance reaches its full meaning.
Mechanisms of Intergovernmental Sport Policy
In the previous section, I reviewed the main factors that structure multi-level governance in sport. As mentioned before, tensions arise constantly between levels of government owing to the grey areas of our Constitution and our political system. In recent decades, several agreements have been put in place to manage these tensions and co-ordinate the actions of the different levels of government (see Table 2 .2). These agreements can be divided in the following categories. The first category comprises general agreements passed in order to help clarify the grey areas of Canada' Sport (2001) . A third category includes all multi-party agreements relative to co-operation on issues that touch on all levels of government. In this category, I briefly discuss the Clear Lake Resolution of 1997 relative to the Canada Games, as well as the Multi-Party Agreement that created VANOC, the Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games. Not listed in Table 2 .2, in a category of their own, are the formal mechanisms of intergovernmental sport policy development, 
Agreements on Divisions of Jurisdiction
The first extensive agreement passed in order to draw a line between the federal government on the one side and the provincial and ter ritorial governments on the other deals with the respective roles of these governments with regard to high performance sport. The High Performance Athlete Development in Canada agreement of 1985 stemmed from a perceived need by governments to "develop a comprehensive and co-ordinated plan of action for the development of high perfor mance athletes in Canada" (Federal-Provincial/Territorial Ministers Responsible for Sport, Recreation and Fitness, 1985, p. 3) . In this docu ment, high performance sport "encompasses athletes who achieve, or, who aspire to achieve, or, who have been identified as having the potential to achieve excellence in World Class competition" (Federal Provincial/Territorial Ministers Responsible for Sport, Recreation and Fitness, 1985, p. 3) . In the preamble, governments acknowledged the limits of clarifying roles, recognizing first that any such exercise always involves some degree of overlap and second, that precise clarification is not possible in all instances. Finally, the governments underlined the fact that sport evolves with time and that delineations may eventually need to be revised accordingly. The core of the docu ment was a discussion regarding a long list of areas in which some were identified as exclusive to the provincial and territorial govern ments, while others were exclusive to the federal government, and still others were shared between the two. Table 2 .3 lists some of these areas of responsibility in each of the three categories (i.e., provincial/ territorial, shared, and federal). The provincial and territorial mandate with regard to high performance sport consists of development up to the national level. As for the federal role, the agreement lists areas relevant to national and international sport. Despite this division of roles, "the shared responsibilities program areas outnumber those allocated to one level of government" as stated in the CSP (Sport Canada, 2002a, p. 12) . Indeed, Table 2 .3 clearly shows that, in many areas of high performance sport, responsibility is shared.
The second agreement I wish to discuss here is the National Recreation Statement of 1987. The 16-page document was approved at the Federal-Provincial/Territorial Conference of Ministers of Sport and Recreation in Quebec City in September 1987 (Interprovincial Sport and Recreation Council, 1987) . It originated from earlier documents and declarations stating the 'primacy' of the provinces in recreation (defined as including sport) as well as recognition by the federal government of such primacy. In claiming this role, pro vincial and territorial governments were accepting broad respon sibilities including the adoption of policies that put the emphasis on "the importance and value of recreation and leisure and the importance of recreation and leisure as a social service," thus com mitting significant resources to support provincial organizations and municipalities-"the primary public supplier of direct recreation services"-as well as to meet regularly with other governments to co-ordinate public policies (Interprovincial Sport and Recreation Council, 1987, pp. 8-9) . The statement also recognized a role for the federal government, but a complementary one, involving itself pri marily in activities that are national and international in scope and by providing for the development of recreation programs "in facilities and institutions under the sole jurisdiction of the federal govern ment" (Interprovincial Sport and Recreation Council, 1987, p. 12) . The federal government was also expected to distribute information to encourage citizens to participate in recreation and physical activity, as well as to develop a central database for information on various forms of recreation and related programs. Interestingly enough for this chapter, the statement also included a complete section on mechanisms of intergovernmental co-operation and on the need thereof. It listed four main reasons why such co-operation is desir able: to enhance the quality of programs through the exchange of ideas, to avoid duplication, to define and maintain a clear delineation of roles, and to facilitate the resolution of issues. These motives are still relevant today.
Multi-Party Agreements
This category includes agreements that set the rules of co-operation as well as the respective roles of all parties involved in multi-level initiatives such as hosting sport events. These agreements are central to Canadian sport policy, since they provide the framework for the federal Hosting Program (see Chapter VIII on hosting). The Clear Lake Resolution was adopted in 1997 30 years after the first Canada Games. The Canada Games "represent a unity of purpose to celebrate the sporting character of Canada through a high quality multi-sport event, which includes opportunities for regional exchange and learn ing, making the Canada Games a national sport development asset" (Canada Games, 2010, paragraph 2) . The Resolution also laid out rules reaffirming the Canada Games Council (incorporated in 1991) as the non-profit organization in charge of the Games. The Resolution included five appendices and two schedules. Appendix 1 described the strategic priorities of the ministers for the Games in terms such as athlete-centred, values-based, access, athletic excellence, and public interest. Appendix 2 provided the financial framework for the Games (i.e., what share of the funding each level of government must provide). For example, with regard to operating costs, the pub lic sector funding is broken down as follows: 52% from the federal government, 16% from the hosting province or territory, and 32% from the hosting society. With regard to 'base capital contribution,' the federal govern ment, the provincial or territorial government, and the hosting munic ipality are expected to contribute CA$ 2M each. Also, Sport Canada is to provide funds to cover the travel costs for athletes, mission staff and officials. Appendix 3 provided a detailed list of the areas in which the Canada Games Council can make final decisions, relating mainly to the day-to-day operations of the Games. Any area that touches on the main provision of the Resolution and is political in nature remains the responsibility of the federal and provincial/territorial governments. Appendix 4 outlined the provincial/territorial rotation for hosting the Games from 1997 to 2009. The Resolution still consti tutes the framework for the Canada Games under the current Canada Games component of the Federal Hosting Program. Interestingly enough, originally, although the Resolution involved municipalities, they were not partners in this agreement. In the development of the Resolution, provincial and territorial governments played the roles of mediation and regulation of federal-municipal relations with regard to the Games. However, as of 2009, multi-party hosting agreements have been introduced that include all three levels of government (Personal communication with a public official).
Interesting features of the Canada Games in terms of gover nance include the interplay between the Canada Games Council and the hosting societies. According to its stated mission, "the Canada Games Council delivers the Canada Games as a unique, premium, nation building, multi-sport event and works continuously to strengthen the Canada Games Movement, in partnership with government, the private sector and the sport community" (Canada Games, 2010, paragraph 5) . The Canada Games Council is managed by a board of directors that includes ex-officio members from federal and provincial/territorial governments and national sport organiza tions as well as observers/members at large (i.e., members of current and future hosting societies). Several representatives of the private sector serve different functions on the Board, namely as chairs. The board of directors of hosting societies is similar to the Council in its composition. For example, the Board of Directors of the Halifax 2011 Host Society includes a chair originating from the private sector and representatives from both the provincial government and the community. Two additional members are from the Canada Games Council. Therefore, even if these structures are private orga nizations on paper, their governance structure presents complex inter-organizational linkages (Thibault & Harvey, 1997) wherein the two upper levels of government are ensured a significant presence, both centrally and locally, in decision-making processes related to the Games. They perceive themselves as partners with civil society, while ensuring oversight of these organizations, following a long-standing, neo-corporatist-like form of governance of sport (i.e., a model where the state plays an active role in the organization of interest groups) (Harvey, Thibault, & Rail, 1995) .
The Multi-Party Agreement for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games had a similar structure to that of the Canada Games, but its scope with respect to the diversity of stakeholders involved is far greater. Signed on November 14, 2002 , the agreement was set in motion before the Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games were to be awarded to Vancouver. The document was designed to accom pany the Vancouver 2010 Bid Corporation and prepare the creation of the Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games (OCOG) in the event that the games were awarded to Vancouver. The Agreement was signed by the governments of Canada and British Columbia, the City of Vancouver, the Resort Municipality of Whistler, the Canadian Olympic Committee (COC), the Canadian Paralympic Committee (CPC) and the Vancouver 2010 Bid Corporation. The Agreement was 23 pages in length (with another 24 pages of appendices) and fulfilled the IOC's requirements with regard to the Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games and was consistent with all relevant Government of Canada policies and laws, such as the Hosting Policy and the Official Languages Act (see Chapter XII on official languages), among others. The Agreement also established the respective contributions of each level of government (which eventually ended up being higher). It also stipulated membership of 20 for the future OCOG, a non-profit agency. The members were to be appointed as follows: three by the Government of Canada, three by the Government of British Columbia, two by the City of Vancouver, two by the Resort Municipality of Whistler, seven by the COC, one by the CPC, one by the Lil'wat and Squamish First Nations and one to be chosen by vote of the other members. The innovative feature of this board was undoubtedly the one seat allocated to the above mentioned First Nations' bands. As such, their role and status as hosting nations were recognized. Once again, in this example, there was a significant presence of government representatives on the board, 10 out of 22 when we include the First Nations. While it may be conceived as a way of ensuring seamless relationships between all levels of government and civil society-more precisely here the IOC through its local representatives in the COCthis feature also raised the question of the truly 'private corporation' nature of the OCOG.
Another interesting feature of the Agreement is section 43, which lists the provisions against conflicts of interest and where it is stated that no member of the House of Commons or Senate of Canada, no current or former federal public office holder or servant, no member of the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia and no member of the Vancouver City Council or Whistler City Council could be admitted to any share of the Agreement or to any benefits or profit that may arise. 12 While these provisions clearly protect the integrity of the OCOG, they do not mean that the representatives of the different levels of government were not actually represent ing the interest of their employer. Quite the contrary: for some, this kind of government representation in such multi-level agree ments puts these representatives in a position of conflict of interest between the organizations of which they are members on the one hand and, on the other hand, the employer to which they report. Such was the opinion expressed by key stakeholders for the pur pose of the evaluation of the 2005 FINA championships in Montreal (Parent, 2006) .
The counterargument is that governments invested a great deal of financial resources and thus, should ensure that these funds were used appropriately and legislation and policy were complied with and followed. Moreover, the presence of the different stakeholders on the same board may facilitate the necessary flow of information between the stakeholders. The question that then arises relates to the transparency of these structures. They are presented as private but are they? It also raises the question of accountability of elected officials. Let us consider the example of the language scandal that erupted (mostly in Quebec) from the near-total absence of French during the opening ceremonies of the Vancouver Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games. How could the Canadian Heritage min ister not be held at least partially responsible for this oversight that became so divisive for the country, when he was so well represented on VANOC? The answers to these questions notwithstanding, for the purpose of this chapter, the multi-party agreement truly constitutes a mechanism of multi-level governance which, in the end, delivered successful Games. The Agreement also served as a template for the more recent multi-party agreement for the 2015 Toronto Pan Am Games, an agreement that has already resulted in controversy on the same language issue (Bourgault-Côté, 2010).
Mechanism for Federal-Provincial/Territorial Collaboration
Although presented somewhat late in this chapter, the mechanism for federal-provincial/territorial collaboration has been central to the multi-level governance of sport policy in Canada since the 1960s, although it only became an established mechanism in 1986 (see Figure 2 .1). In the 1990s, its focus was primarily on initiatives relating to the Canada Games, the National Coaching Certification Program and Aboriginal issues. 13 Since 2000, the level of activity of that mecha nism has increased significantly, as the CSP was developed, adopted and implemented. Today, as we shall see, it is active on a number of issues. Indeed, it is through this mechanism that the agreements discussed above have been negotiated and agreed upon; that the provincial and territorial governments have adopted the CSP; that the implementation and monitoring of the CSP have been carried out and common goals have been developed. In short, it is through this mechanism and its complex intricacies that collaboration between the two upper levels of government in sport and physical activity really takes place, or not. The current structure of the mechanism derives from, and follows, the National Recreation Statement, but its origin is earlier, as mentioned above. Before describing the mechanism, it is important to note that its structure is nevertheless informal in essence, meaning that it is not mandated through the Constitution, and therefore does not have any constitutional status. It is the result of evolving relationships between the two major levels of govern ment. Reflecting the formal constitutional divide, municipalities are not part of the decision-making process, an exclusion that leaves the provincial and territorial governments free to exercise their preroga tive over local governments. 
DEPUTY MINISTERS' COMMITTEE
At the top and centre of Figure 2 .1 appears the Federal Provincial/Territorial Ministers' Conference, the decisional body composed of all the provincial and territorial ministers in charge of sport, recreation, and physical activity. The two federal ministers present (i.e., Canadian Heritage (sport) and Health (physical activ ity)) are also both members and co-chairs of the Conference. As well, they preside over the agenda items that are relevant to their mandate. Finally, there is a third co-chair (who presides on all issues) who is the minister in charge of sport, recreation, and physical activity for the province or territory hosting the next Canada Games. As such, provincial/territorial co-chairing rotates from one province/territory to the next preceding the Canada Games. This represents a concrete illustration of how the separation of sport and physical activity in two distinct federal administrative units is a factor in the governance of federal-provincial/territorial government relationships. Not only does this separation lead to a complicated 'game of musical chairs' between the two federal ministers (in their role as co-chairs) when the time comes to discuss issues relevant to their respective man dates, it also results in a dual committee structure with, on the one hand, committees in charge of sport and, on the other hand, commit tees in charge of physical activity and recreation, as outlined below.
In the organization of meetings with federal-provincial/ territorial ministers, it was agreed that ministers would meet three times over the span of four years, two of those meetings to occur just prior to the Canada Games. The conference is organized by the Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat (CICS), an agency created in 1973 by the first Ministers to manage the logistics of senior-level federal-provincial/territorial conferences in all areas of federal-provincial/territorial government collaboration. During these conferences, ministers make decisions that the deputy minis ters have the responsibility of implementing. To achieve this, deputy Ministers created working groups to provide directions to the Federal Provincial/Territorial Sport Committee (FPTSC) with regard to sport issues and to the Federal-Provincial/Territorial Physical Activity and Recreation Committee (PARC) with regard to issues related to physical activity and recreation and tasked their respective working groups with the ground work. It is really at the level of the FPTSC and PARC that detailed negotiations and recommendations are developed. These recommendations are then discussed, and issues are identified at a meeting of the Interprovincial Sport and Recreation Council (ISRC) (on which all provincial and territorial governments have represen tation) and federal officials (who are members of FPTSC and PARC). That meeting is chaired by the ISRC chair and is co-chaired by FPTSC and PARC chairs as issues of their respective mandates are discussed. The outcomes of these meetings are then reported to the Federal-Provincial/Territorial Deputy Ministers' Committee where decisions are drafted for submission and approbation at the Ministers' Conference. In short, it is through this movement back and forth from the ministers' conferences to the committees and working groups that federal-provincial/territorial collaboration occurs. As of December 2012, the FPTSC active working groups were: Canadian Sport for Life Management Team, Monitoring of CSP Implementation, High Performance Issues, and Sport and Recreation Infrastructure. Each year, working groups are formed or dismantled as a function of the needs emerging from discussions, meetings and conferences at the minister and deputy Minister levels.
The existence of this governance structure is a clear indication of the need for the two upper levels of government to collaborate on issues of sport and physical activity policy, given the nature of these two governing bodies and the intricacies of our Constitution. The collaborative nature of the structure was meant to uphold, among other duties, the intent of the National Recreation Statement, and to smooth out the jurisdictional grey areas of our Constitution where there is the potential for friction and divergence of opinion between governments about sport and physical activity policy in this country. While there is always impetus for the federal government to adopt national goals, policies and programs, there is also a constant preoc cupation on the part the provincial and territorial governments to protect their jurisdictions while, at the same time, to influence the federal government to adopt those policies and programs that suit their own policy. I shall return to this later on, but at this point, it is important to understand what is being discussed at this level. One of the major functions of the mechanism that emerged from the pro cess of developing and adopting the first version of the CSP (Sport Canada, 2002a) was the negotiation of multi-year federal-provincial/ territorial priorities for collaborative action (Sport Canada, 2002b , 2007 . These priorities set by both governments addressed each of the four CSP goals. The first priorities covered the years [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . For this period, in regard to the enhanced participation goal, priorities were to increase participation in sport and to increase the presence of sport and physical activity in school. For the enhanced excellence goals, enhancing athlete and sport system performance was the only priority identified. For the enhanced capacity goal, priorities were to implement the competence-based program for coaches, to develop a sport event hosting policy, to improve sport and recreation facilities, to implement the Canadian strategy on the ethical conduct in sport and to foster the diversification of resources for sport organizations and Aboriginal sport development. As for the enhanced interaction goal, priorities were to increase awareness of sport within govern ment (i.e., other departments), to ensure regular communication with the sport community, to enhance collaboration between sport organizations and to negotiate bilateral government agreements to advance the CSP. A second set of priorities was developed for the years 2007-2012 and focused on continuing the initiatives established in the previous document and to work on new priorities in order to further implement the CSP. Among the list of 12 new priorities, the alignment of the overall sport system with the Sport for Life (LongTerm Athlete Development) model was the most pervasive theme. Three priorities were also adopted to pave the road for the evaluation of the CSP, in light of its eventual renewal when it expired in 2012.
On June 27, 2012, at the same time that the CSP 2012 was adopted, a new set of Priorities for Collaborative Action 2012 was made public, to be developed further for review and approval at the 2013 Ministers Conference (Federal and Provincial/Territorial Ministers Responsible for Sport, Physical Activity and Recreation, 2012) . The 2012 priorities are as follows:
1. Support introduction to sport programming with a focus on traditionally under-represented and/or marginalized populations; 2. Develop a common data collection methodology with which to identify infrastructure priorities for the sport and recre ation sectors; 3. Define and clarify the roles and responsibilities of govern ments and key stakeholder organizations in the high perfor mance and competitive sport system; 4. 
Bilateral Agreements
The last (but not the least) key feature of the multi-level governance of sport under the current CSP is formed by the bipartite agreements between the federal and the provincial/territorial governments. These bilateral agreements are yet another form of cost-sharing between the two upper levels of government. However, they were not only key in the adoption of the CSP by the provincial and territorial govern ments, but also play an important role for the federal government in that they provide a vehicle for this government to be active in sport participation where its jurisdiction is limited. The bilateral nature of these agreements gives the CSP the flexibility to adjust to the respec tive priorities of provinces and territories and, as such, is touted by the federal government as a Canadian policy (i.e., reflecting its decentralized nature) as opposed to Canada's policy. Sport Canada has three types of bilateral agreements with the provincial and territorial governments: generic agreements aimed at increasing sport participation; Aboriginal agreements meant to increase the capacity of provincial/territorial sport organizations in charge of Aboriginal sport and physical activity; and agreements to support team travel for participation in the North American Indigenous Games. From one jurisdiction to another, the bilateral agreements take different forms, for example, some provincial or territorial governments have combined the generic and Aboriginal agreements while others have kept them separate and have targeted different priorities. The federal funding portion of every agreement is always based on the fact that the provincial and territorial gov ernments will match the federal funds. Tables 2.4 In terms of the content of the bilateral agreements, as mentioned above, they vary significantly from one province/territory to another. For example, the 2009-2011 Sport for More bilateral agreement with Ontario supports the development of local sport programs in First Nations communities; projects designed to increase the sport partici pation level of underrepresented groups such as ethnic minorities and women; projects to reduce the number of drop-outs in provin cial sport organizations; and funding for the Promoting Life-Skills in Aboriginal Groups (P.L.A.Y.) program. In Manitoba, the generic bilateral agreement is related to the community level. For example, the objectives include building community capacity and providing sustainable programming through the development of local partner ships, and developing low or no-cost sport programs for communities where youth are underserved. In Saskatchewan, among other objec tives, the bilateral agreement is aimed at supporting the planning and implementation of the LTAD model in provincial sport organi zations. All in all, bilateral agreements are becoming an important mechanism of federal-provincial/territorial collaboration in areas where the federal role is far from obvious.
An Implementation and Monitoring Group
Our last example of a mechanism for federal-provincial/territorial collaboration is the Implementation and Monitoring Group put in place in the context of the 2012 CSP. One of the innovative features of the policy is the inclusion of a logic model, which illustrates policy inputs and outputs, corresponding immediate outcomes, CSP 2012 objectives, CSP goals and ultimate outcomes. Actually, at the moment of the adoption of the policy, the complex two-page grid that consti tutes the overall logic model was not complete, as the specific input/ activities/outputs were still under development. The logic model is a Total classic feature of the new Public Management policy frameworks in which policies are evidence-based and evaluated through measurable outcomes and outputs. Indeed, the Implementation and Monitoring Group is ". . . responsible for collating and sharing the action plans of governments and NGOs, and for monitoring progress. This group will oversee the development of appropriate indicators and metrics and ensure that longer-term pan-Canadian impacts are tracked and evaluated" (Sport Canada, 2012, p. 19) . How can this mechanism be seen as a multi-level governance mechanism? It is by virtue of Committee's make-up, which includes academics, representatives of federal-provincial/territorial governments and representatives of the sport system.
The Challenges of Multi-Level Governance
The purpose of this chapter was to focus on multi-level governance of sport in Canada. Several factors shaping this governance were described at length as well as current mechanisms of collaboration between different levels of government. Bilateral agreements foster better collaboration between the federal and provincial/territorial governments in areas of sport participation and Aboriginal sport. This does not mean that difficult issues will disappear. Tensions arising from the federal government's motivation to create a seam less sport system, which potentially translates into pan-Canadian plans and initiatives, may end up creating resistance from provincial and territorial governments. One possible example of just such an occasion for disagreement is the Canadian Sport for Life/Long-Term Athlete Development program that is percolating throughout the Canadian sport system as the federal government strives for its integration not only at the national level but also provincially and locally. Not all the provincial and territorial governments are open to change in their sport systems simply for the sake of adopting the federal plan.
One of the objectives of this chapter was to put some emphasis on the interaction of municipalities with the higher levels of govern ment. The examination of existing forms of collaboration leaves us with the impression that multi-level governance only truly occurs with the hosting of games through multi-party agreements. In all other areas, relationships and collaborations occur at the federal provincial/territorial levels. Where local authorities are concerned, provincial and territorial governments retain their decision-making prerogative over this level of government.
New challenges are foreseeable in the near future as sport for development within Canada is becoming a central preoccupation thanks to organizations like Sport Matters Group, which lobby the federal government to ensure that these challenges are at the fore front in the next iteration of the Canadian Sport Policy. In addition, new developments towards the use of sport as a strategy for larger social roles such as the integration of immigrants have the potential to partially redefine the role of Sport Canada. One such example is the Working Together Initiative where different federal government units, provincial/territorial governments as well as several multi service organizations team up to find innovative forms of horizontal and vertical governance of sport programs.
In summary, this chapter has shown the sheer complexity of intergovernmental relationships in sport in Canada. The main factors structuring these relationships are not going to disappear, which means that mechanisms to manage these inter-relationships are a necessary feature of sport policy in this country. The decentralized nature of Canada may lead to greater complexity in the forms of multi-level governance of sport, but more centralized countries such as England, for example, do have similar issues of intergovernmental relationships, only at different levels according to the specificities of their political system. Moreover it can be argued that the decen tralized nature of governance mechanisms in Canada are indeed a strength in the sense that they are more sensitive to the expression of regional differences in such a vast and diverse country.
Notes

